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Abstract
Using an analytically solvable general equilibrium model, we study how
the distribution of economic activities is aﬀected by the trade-oﬀ between
pecuniary externalities, as dependent on transportation costs, and localized
technological externalities, as dependent on inter-regional spillovers. We
model localized technological externalities as having a cost saving eﬀect that
can be interpreted as a technological advantage, like the presence of inter-
ﬁrms knowledge spillovers. Under the assumption of capital mobility and
labour immobility, we show that whereas decreasing transportation costs,
i.e. promoting market openness, leads to sudden agglomeration, increas-
ing inter-regional spillovers, i.e. promoting technological openness, favors
a smoother transition between diﬀerent levels of ﬁrms concentration and
ultimately leads to a less uneven distribution of welfare.
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11 Introduction
The skewed nature of the distribution of economic activities found in both devel-
oped and developing countries, at any scale, from cities to regions, can be the result
of both market mediated interactions, such as labor pooling or intermediate goods
availability, and non tradable diﬀerences across geographical locations. Beside the
eﬀect of trade openness in ﬁnal markets and increased mobility in factors of pro-
ductions, like labour and capital, economic agglomeration is plausibly enhanced by
the institutional framework, the availability of public infrastructures, higher levels
of human and social capital and the local and tacit nature of technical knowledge.
Indeed, the abundant presence of agglomerated production clusters away from big
cities and main transport systems suggests that forces other than transportation
costs, advantages due to larger local demand, or deeper factor markets, are at
work. These forces are not exclusively acting in high-tech sectors, like semicon-
ductors or ICT services, but are often pervasive of the entire economy. Analyzing
the Italian manufacturing industry, Bottazzi et al. (2008) ﬁnd that sectors like
Food Products, Leather Products or Basic Metal Workings are highly agglomer-
ated and their agglomeration cannot be explained by the presence of transport
infrastructures or localized demand. This is not a peculiar aspect of Italian man-
ufacturing, as similar results have been found for the US (Ellison and Glaeser,
1997), France (Maurel and Sedillot, 1999), Germany (Brenner, 2006) and the UK
(Devereux et al., 2004).
If localized non-pecuniary advantages are important in describing the observed
ﬁnal outcome of ﬁrms locational choice, at least as much as pecuniary market-
mediated interactions, it becomes relevant to investigate what aggregate eﬀects can
be observed when the institutional, cultural and social barriers which make these
advantages local are, at least partially, abated. Among the non-pecuniary factors
which presumably provide local advantages in production, a particular attention
has been devoted to the possible presence of technological externalities (Marshall,
1920) via localized knowledge spillovers which allow co-located companies to share
part of their knowledge sources, reduce innovation costs and gain competitive
advantages with respect to ﬁrms located elsewhere (see for instance the review in
Audretsch and Feldman, 2004). In their re-visitation of the notion of “localized
learning” Malmberg and Maskell (2006) notice how the formation of international
regulating and supervising authorities, the development of common commercial
laws, the internationalization of the capital market and the increased mobility of
ideas are likely to alter the geographical reach of knowledge spillovers. Ultimately,
how does a variation in the degree of “openness” of these social and technological
factors and, in particular, their interaction with the freeness of trade and the
commercial “globalization”, aﬀect the geographical distribution of ﬁrms?
In the present paper we intend to address this question inside the domain
2of New Economic Geography (NEG). Since Krugman (1991b) this literature has
mostly dealt with the eﬀect of pecuniary externalities on the spatial distribution
of economic activities. Firms agglomeration arises as the result of a market me-
diated circular causation: ﬁrms locate where demand is high and demand moves
where there are many ﬁrms. In early models, localized technological externalities
were disposed oﬀ explicitly as sources of economic agglomeration, essentially be-
cause presumed to be particularly prone to measurement problems and modeling
sloppiness (Krugman, 1991a, p.53). Notwithstanding the original lack of inter-
est, recent theoretical contributions to NEG have extended the investigation by
including non-pecuniary external economies. A number of works have adopted
the type of externality introduced in growth models by Grossman and Helpman
(1991), postulating an R&D sector with marginal cost of innovation decreasing
in the number of existing innovations. In particular Martin (1999) and Martin
and Ottaviano (1999) include a Grossman-Helpman type of externality in a foot-
loose capital model where capital is mobile and labour is not. Despite being the
endogenous force behind growth, the technological externality is not causing ag-
glomeration because its advantage can be globally exploited. In fact, patents or
capital created at a lower cost in the most innovative region can migrate and ex-
ert their innovativeness also in the other region. This is not the case of Baldwin
and Forslid (2000), who consider the same type of technological externality, but
this time with mobile workers and immobile capital. In their model each location
has its own R&D sector so that the technological externality can be a source of
agglomeration. Moreover they introduce an inter-regional spillover parameter, a
sort of “technological openness”, which measures to what extent non-pecuniary
advantages are location speciﬁc or can be shared across regions. Increasing the
ﬂow of knowledge between regions reduces the overall cost of innovation, so that
location choice is less relevant and agglomerated outcomes less likely. Ultimately,
the equilibria of the economy and their desirability in terms of welfare are de-
cided by the interplay between market openness, as dependent on trade costs, and
technological openness, as dependent on inter-regional spillovers. The model is
however not analytically tractable, and the authors analyze stability only for a
predetermined set of benchmark equilibria corresponding to full agglomerated and
symmetrically non-agglomerated economies.
In the present paper we advance an analytically tractable general equilibrium
model that explicitly accounts for the presence of technological externalities via
localized knowledge spillovers. Following Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), we ob-
tain analytical tractability through partial factor immobility. In particular, we
impose labor immobility and assume that households are both local workers and
global investors, as in Martin and Rogers (1995). In this way the mobile factor
is represented by the capital, whose rent is payed to households/shareholders and
3consumed in the location in which they reside. We believe that this assumption
better represents today increased capital mobility, specially in geographical area
like the European Union, in which relative regional homogeneity leads to ﬂows of
capital which are hardly matched by ﬂow in any other productive factor. Mar-
tin and Rogers (1995) and the more recent Dupont and Martin (2006), lacking
any self-reinforcing mechanism, reproduce ﬁrms agglomeration exclusively via the
so called home market eﬀect, induced by the presence of regional diﬀerences in
the exogenous endowment of factors. Conversely, in our model agglomeration can
emerge with a-priori identical locations and is sustained by the endogenous eﬀect
of the technological externality. This externality is introduced through a mech-
anism inspired by Grossman and Helpman (1991). The enhancement of capital
creation capability due to scale economies in R&D activity is modeled as a direct
eﬀect on ﬁnal good producers by an increase in operating margins due to a sharing
of ﬁxed costs. Our cost sharing assumption represents a technological advantage,
like the presence of inter-ﬁrms knowledge spillovers. Inside this framework, we
introduce an inter-regional knowledge spillover parameter describing the degree of
localization of the technological externality, much in line with Baldwin and Forslid
(2000). The analytical tractability of our model allows for the explicit derivation
of geographical equilibria, deﬁned as those distribution of ﬁrms where households
do not have incentives to change capital allocation.
We are aware that the empirical literature has not found an agreement on
the general functioning, not to mention the speciﬁc transmission mechanism, of
localized knowledge spillovers. Some issues has been raised about the actual ef-
fectiveness of the econometric models and tools adopted in their measurements,
see e.g. Breschi and Lissoni (2001b,a). Despite the interest localized knowledge
spillovers have attracted, the precise scale and scope of their action is still an open
question (Rallet and Torre, 1999), as much as whether they uniquely act as pos-
itive externalities or, in the long run, turn out to be negative externalities due
to lock-in eﬀects (Boschma, 2005). For these reasons our formulation has all the
limits of a toy-model. Nonetheless, it allows us to derive analytical result using a
general equilibrium framework.
Our analysis conﬁrms previous ﬁndings by Baldwin and Forslid (2000) about
the stabilizing nature of inter-regional spillovers: the strongest the link between
the two regions the larger the interval of transportation costs which lead to ﬁrms
equidistribution. We also ﬁnd that if the eﬀect is strong enough, there exists a
smooth equilibrium transition between agglomeration and equidistribution, with
partly agglomerated economy for intermediate values of transportation costs. In
this case an opening of inter-regional trade does not entail an abrupt reallocation of
economic activities nor the hysteresis eﬀect, typical of NEG model, which locks the
economy in a core-periphery equilibrium also if higher trade costs are reintroduced.
4Welfare analysis reveals that agglomeration can entail lower welfare level for the
economic periphery, also when it represents the geographic equilibrium. The huge
“welfare gap” existing between core and periphery regions, which often hinders
the implementation of trade opening policies, could be reduced and eventually
eliminated if market and technological integrations were pursued together. We
provide conditions under which either policies are to be preferred.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the
model and derive the market equilibrium. In Section 3 we ﬁnd the geographical
equilibria of our economy and analyze their stability by studying how changes in
the distribution of capital inﬂuence capital rents in both regions. In Section 4
we complete the characterization of geographical equilibria by making explicit
their dependence on the parameters ruling trade and technological openness. The
welfare analysis is presented in Section 5. In Section 6 we consider the case of non
a-priori symmetric regions and discuss how these asymmetries aﬀect our results
on geographical equilibria. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Consider an economy with two locations, l = 1,2, both populated by L households1
so that 2L is the total number of households. Each household is endowed with
labour and capital and supply them inelastically. The economy has a modern and
a traditional sector. Whereas the traditional sector supplies an homogeneous good,
the modern sector supplies diﬀerentiated products. In both sectors production is
localized.
Households are “local” workers and “global” consumers, that is, they are im-
mobile and work where they reside, and they can buy goods produced in both
locations. Households are also “global” investors, that is, they can supply capital
to both locations. Modern goods are traded at a transportation cost which takes
the form of an iceberg cost: for one unit of a diﬀerentiated good to reach the other
region τ ∈ [1,+∞) units must be shipped. As a result 1/τ ∈ (0,1] is an index of
freeness of trade. Traditional goods and capital are traded at no costs.
Consumption All households have the same preferences and decide how much
of the traditional good CT and of the bundle of modern goods CM to consume as






with   ∈ (0,1). As a result a fraction   of each household income is spent on CM
and a fraction (1− ) is spent on CT. The utility of the bundle CM is of constant
1We consider the case of unequally populated regions in Section 6.











σ > 1, (2.2)
with ci the consumption of good i, i = 1,...,N. This implies that the N modern
goods are substitutes, with a mutual elasticity of substitution equal to σ (cfr. Dixit
and Stiglitz, 1977).
Production Each household is endowed with one unit of labour, and there is
not an a priori distinction between workers of the modern and traditional sector.
The traditional sector uses labour as unique input under constant returns to scale
with unitary marginal costs. Due to the large number of potential producers, as we
shall see at least 2L(1− ) at equilibrium, this market is perfectly competitive and
the traditional good is sold at its marginal cost, which we take as the normalization
price of the economy.
We assume a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms, N, active in the modern sector. Both
capital and labour are used in the production of modern goods. The amount of
labour vi that ﬁrm i employs to produce an amount yi of modern output is given
by the usual scale economy cost function
vi = βyi + αli , (2.3)
where β is constant across ﬁrms and across locations, and αli is the ﬁxed amount
of labour necessary to start production. Whereas the marginal productivity of
labour is assumed to be constant and equal in the two locations, the ﬁxed amount
of labour might depend on the location li of ﬁrm i. We will assume that αli is
a function of ﬁrms’ location, as stated below. Each ﬁrm also needs one unit of
capital, available at a price ri. This, at equilibrium, is given by the operating
proﬁts
ri = piyi − wivi , (2.4)
where pi is the price of good i and wi is the cost of labour of ﬁrm i.
Given the structure of preferences in (2.2) each ﬁrm produces a diﬀerent prod-
uct. The total number of varieties produced in each location is thus equal to the
amount of capital available there.
We assume that each household is endowed with the same amount of capital
N/2L. Assuming that households maximize their capital revenues, and since cap-
ital is moved without costs, their investment choices are symmetric so that each
6household invests a fraction 1/2L of capital in each ﬁrm.2
The market structure is that of monopolistic competition, that is, each ﬁrm
maximizes its proﬁts given market demand elasticity and irrespectively of other
ﬁrms behavior.
Technological externality So far our assumptions closely mimic footloose cap-
ital models, such as Martin and Rogers (1995) or Dupont and Martin (2006). De-
parting from these works, we introduce a localized technological externality, which
we model as a term of direct ﬁrms interaction not mediated by market forces, like
the presence of inter-ﬁrms knowledge spillovers. More speciﬁcally we assume that
the required ﬁxed amount of labour αl decreases with the number of ﬁrms located









  , (2.5)
where nl is the number of ﬁrms producing modern goods in location l ∈ {1,2}.
Equation (2.5) represents a positive localized externality because the presence of
more local producers decreases the production cost. The parameter λ ∈ (0,1]
governs the inter-regional spillover. It describes the degree to which technological
externalities are de-localized and ﬁrms in one region can enjoy the cost-reducing
eﬀect of ﬁrms in the other region. Equation (2.5) is analogous to the the production
function of the R&D sector as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), used also in a
geographic context by Martin (1999); Martin and Ottaviano (1999); Baldwin and
Forslid (2000). The latter work also consider the impact of a inter-regional spillover
λ as we do here. The diﬀerence between this literature and the present work is
that we do not directly model a R&D sector and a market for patents, but instead
assume that each ﬁrm operates an internal R&D unit. The inter-ﬁrm knowledge
spillover improves the productivity of research and development activities and
generates a ﬁxed cost reduction. This reduction increases proportionally with the
number of ﬁrms, and thus R&D units, located in the same region. The advantage
of our formulation is that we are able to solve the model analytically, that is,
to ﬁnd all its geographical equilibria, study their global stability, and perform a
comparative dynamics exercise on the space of trade and technological openness
parameters.
The marginal decrease of ﬁxed costs, or increase of R&D productivity, with
the number of ﬁrms located in the same region is dependent on the inter-regional
2This is what it is usually assumed in footloose capital models (see Baldwin et al. (2003)
p.74) to avoid the complications resulting from household strategic interaction. This assumption
is harmless at a geographical equilibrium, that is, at a distribution of ﬁrms where either rents in
both locations are equal or all ﬁrms are in the same location. It is, however, not harmless out of
equilibrium and stability results do in general depend on it.
7spillover parameter λ that captures the “technological openness” of the all econ-
omy. For low values of λ the economy is split in technological separated parts and
ﬁrms can exclusively exploit advantages derived by co-location in the same region.
In particular when λ = 0, research and development in the two locations are com-
pletely segregated and the total ﬁxed cost to be paid per location are constant and
equal to Nα. Unless the modern sector is aggregated in one location each ﬁrm pay
more than α in labour ﬁxed costs. For positive values of λ, conversely, the economy
is technologically integrated, and productivity improving positive externalities are
also operating across regions. The higher the λ the higher the eﬀect. Notably, the
existence of inter-regional spillovers impacts on ﬁxed costs in two ways. Firstly, it
creates a global advantage in reducing production cost of all ﬁrms thus increasing
modern sector proﬁts. Secondly, it makes location choice less relevant and uneven
outcomes less likely. In the extreme case of λ = 1 the technological externality
operates across all ﬁrms and each ﬁrm pays the same ﬁxed cost α, irrespectively
of their geographical distribution.
2.1 Market equilibria
Having speciﬁed all the elements of our economy, we derive, for any given ﬁxed
distribution of ﬁrms, the equilibrium capital rents for both locations. Due to per-
fect competition and constant returns to scale in the traditional sector, traditional
workers wages are equal to prices. Moreover, due to zero transportation costs,
prices and thus wages, must be the same in both locations.
Given that workers are not mobile, at an economic equilibrium it should be
indiﬀerent to work in the traditional or modern sector. As a result wages in the
two sectors are equal. For this reason it is convenient to use wages as the numer` aire
of the economy.
In order to ﬁnd equilibrium prices, quantities, and proﬁts of the modern sector,
one should in principle analyze each of the N product markets. Nevertheless the
problem can be simpliﬁed by considering only a representative market for each
location. In fact, location by location, ﬁrms produce using the same technology,
face the same demand (due to the CES utility all goods are substitutes), and the
same labour supply. This implies that equilibrium prices, quantities and wages
are the same for all the ﬁrms in a given location. We can thus consider only two
representative product markets, one for each location l.
We proceed as follows. Exploiting the CES preference structure (2.2), we com-
pute consumer demand for the goods produced in each location. We use that all
goods are substitutes, that transportation costs impact the consumption of foreign
goods, and that the budget constraint depends also on the capital rent. Using the
monopolistic competition structure of the market, and knowing consumers demand
elasticity, we derive ﬁrms pricing behavior. By setting supply equal to demand
8we are able to determine equilibrium quantities and capital rents as a function of
the parameters of the economy and the distribution of ﬁrms across locations. The
following step is to use capital rents and labour income to determine consumers
demand for the traditional good. From here we can derive the traditional good
required supply and the labour needed to produce it. As a result we can derive
the total labour demand. Next we have to check that the labour market is at equi-
librium too. Since there are two segmented labour markets, requiring that both
clear amounts to posing a constraint on agents preferences and on the scale of the
economy. Finally, we have to impose that capital rents are positive, or otherwise
households do not have any incentive to spent their capital endowment.
Let us start from consumers demand. Denote the quantity consumed by a
consumer who resides in l of a product produced in m as dlm with l,m ∈ {1,2}.

















Agents budget constraints are
 
 I(n1,n2) = n1d11p1 + n2d12p2τ ,
 I(n1,n2) = n1d21p1τ + n2d22p2 , (2.7)
where I(n1,n2) is the income of each consumer which is given by his wage, nor-
malized to 1, plus his share of capital rent, still unknown, as depending on the



























Given the market structure of monopolistic competition, each ﬁrm, knowing con-
sumers inverse demand, sets the output so that marginal revenues are equal to







= β , (2.9)
where ε = ∂ logc/∂ logp is the demand elasticity, and we have used the fact that
wages are normalized to one. Given (2.2), as long as the number of commodities
N is large (see Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977, for the details), it holds that
ε = −σ,





Equating, location by location, demand and supply, we get
 
y1 = Ld11 + Ld21τ
y2 = Ld12τ + Ld22 , (2.11)
where, due to iceberg costs, for one unit of foreign output to be consumed τ
units must be imported. Using the demand derived in (2.8) and substituting the
expression for prices in (2.10) we can easily solve for market equilibrium quantities.
Introducing the freeness of trade parameter φ = τ1−σ, with φ ∈ (0,1], market
equilibrium quantities read

    
    
































yl − αl(n1,n2). (2.14)
Let x = n1/N be the fraction of ﬁrms (or capital) in location 1, so that n2 =
(1 − x)N). Thus rents payed by each ﬁrm can be written as3

    






x + (1 − x)φ
+
φ











xφ + (1 − x)
+
φ




1 − x + λx
,
(2.15)
Notice that this is still an implicit equation because I(x) is a function of r1 and
r2. In fact, with wages normalized to one, and remembering that each households
invests a fraction 1/2L of capital in each ﬁrm, we have
I(x) = 1 +
N
2L
(xr1(x) + (1 − x)r2(x)). (2.16)
3Throughout the paper, without loss of generality, we consider x to be a real number in the
interval [0,1].
10Solving (2.15) for r1(x) and r2(x) we get

    
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I(x) = 1 + R(x) = 1 +







(σ −  )
, (2.18)
and R(x) is the per-capita capital rent.
Equations (2.17-2.18) deﬁne an equilibrium of our economy for every geograph-
ical distribution x provided that, location by location, modern sector ﬁrms’ labour
demand is always smaller than L. The condition will be imposed in the following
where we summarize our ﬁndings
Proposition 2.1. Given the scale of the economy S = N/L, if it holds
S < ˜ S =
  + σ − 2 σ
ασ(1 −  )
, (2.19)
then for any geographical distribution x ∈ [0,1] the global market for the traditional
good, the N global markets for the modern goods, and the two local labour markets
clear with location rents and total per capita rents given by (2.17) and (2.18),
respectively.
Proof. The proof that capital rents are as in (2.17) is in the text. In order to show
that under condition (2.19) both local labour markets clear, notice that under (2.5)
total ﬁxed costs in each location are non-decreasing. As a result the maximum
amount of labour used by the modern sector in location l = 1,2 is achieved when
all ﬁrms are located in l. Consequently condition (2.19) is found by imposing
that the demand for labour of the modern sector when it is totally aggregated in
one region is lower than L. ˜ S is the value of S such that the demand for labour
employed in the modern sector, when fully agglomerated, is exactly L.
Finally to make certain that households do actually invest in the modern sec-
tor we impose that the per-capita rent of the economy is positive. We have the
following
11Lemma 2.1. The per-capita rent of the economy R(x) is positive for any value of








Proof. The per-capita rent R(x) in (2.18) does not depend on φ but does depend
on λ. The given value of ¯ S has been found by equating to zero the minimum
values of per-capita rents, obtained when λ = 0 and ﬁrms are not agglomerated,
or x ∈ (0,1).
In what follows we shall assume that the scale S of the economy is such that
both constraints in (2.19) and (2.20) hold. Since it is always possible to order the
values of ˜ S and ¯ S, this is equivalent to assume that S < min{˜ S, ¯ S}.4 Obviously
the foregoing condition can only be met when ˜ S > 0, or, in terms of the preference
for the modern goods,   < σ/(2σ − 1), so that the share of income spent on
modern goods is not too big.5 Summing up, for any given elasticity of substitution,
provided that preferences for modern goods are not too strong, there always exists
a range of ﬁrms-to-households ratios such that markets in both locations are at
equilibrium and capital rents are non-negative.
The dependence of equilibrium capital rents on the geographical distribution
of ﬁrms is due to both pecuniary and technological externalities. The eﬀect of the
former goes via the sum of local and foreign demand, that is the part of capital
rents in (2.17) which depends on φ. When concentration of local ﬁrms is low, each
ﬁrm faces a high local demand and makes high proﬁts. As the concentration of
local ﬁrms increases, a higher competition lowers the proﬁts coming from the local
demand which, due to positive transportation costs, are not fully compensated by
an increased foreign demand. Thus pecuniary externalities have a negative eﬀect
on agglomeration. The eﬀect becomes stronger as transportation costs increase,
that is, higher τ, or lower φ.
Technological externalities inﬂuence equilibrium capital rents both locally and
globally. The local eﬀect is due to the direct dependence of ﬁrm ﬁxed costs on the
geographical distribution of ﬁrms, as given by the last term of both expressions
in (2.17). The higher the concentration of ﬁrms in location l, the lower the ﬁxed
costs and the higher the capital rent of ﬁrms located there. The global eﬀect of
the technological externality is due to the dependence of local rents in (2.17) on
4By simple computations one can show that ¯ S = min{˜ S, ¯ S} when µ ∈ [0,1/2] or µ ∈ (1/2,1]
and σ < µ2/(2µ − 1) and ˜ S = min{˜ S, ¯ S} otherwise.
5This is the same condition on consumers preferences found in e.g. Forslid and Ottaviano
(2003). Notice that the condition is always satisﬁes when µ ≤ 1/2 and requires σ < µ/(2µ − 1)
when µ > 1/2.
12global capital rents R(x) and acts as a sort of multiplier. In fact, the geographical
distribution has ﬁrst an impact on total ﬁxed costs, and thus on total capital rents
R(x), which, in turn, have a wealth eﬀect on consumers demand, thus aﬀecting the
capital rent each location. An increase in the concentration of ﬁrms, lowers total
ﬁxed costs payed by all ﬁrms, increases total capital rents, increases households
wealth, increases total demand and, in turn, increases capital rents further in a
multiplier fashion. Notice that whereas the local eﬀect increases the rent in a given
location through local agglomeration, the global eﬀect increases capital rents in
both locations, no matter where ﬁrms do actually agglomerate. As we shall see
the overall eﬀect of these two forces and its strength depend both on the inter-
regional spillover λ and on the freeness of trade τ. In general, when λ is low (high)
the technological externality is (not) localized and its variability with the local
concentration is high (low). In the extreme case, λ = 1, both regions have equal
beneﬁts, irrespectively of the geographical distribution of ﬁrms.
3 Geographical equilibria
We assume that capital moves from one location to the other following the rent
diﬀerence ∆(x) = r1(x)−r2(x). When ∆(x) is positive capital ﬂows from location
2 to location 1, the other way round when ∆(x) is negative. The capital dynamics







max{0,∆(x)} if x = 0
F(∆(x)) if 0 < x < 1
min{0,∆(x)} if x = 1
(3.1)
where F is a strictly increasing diﬀerentiable function with F(0) = 0. Despite
diﬀerent functions F correspond to diﬀerent trajectories, their general properties
allow to identify the interior ﬁxed points of the dynamics in (3.1) as the solution
of the equation ∆(x) = 0 and to investigate their global stability looking at the
sign of ∆′(x). The deﬁnition of the dynamical system at the border is due to the
fact that the variable x is constrained in the interval [0,1] so that 0 and 1 are
other possible ﬁxed points, depending on the sign of ∆(0) and ∆(1) respectively.
We have the following
Deﬁnition 3.1. An interior geographical equilibrium ˆ x ∈ (0,1) is an asymptoti-
cally stable ﬁxed point of (3.1), i.e. ∆(ˆ x) = 0 and ∆′(ˆ x) < 0. A border geographical
equilibrium ˆ x ∈ {0,1} is a border asymptotically stable ﬁxed point of (3.1), that
is, x = 0 is a border geographical equilibrium if limx→0+ ∆(x) < 0, x = 1 is a
border geographical equilibrium if limx→1− ∆(x) > 0.
We shall name an interior geographical equilibrium a non-agglomerated econ-


















Figure 1: Existence of diﬀerent type of stable geographical equilibria in the plane
(∆′(1/2),∆(0)).
an agglomerated economy (AG) when at least one border is a geographical equi-
librium.
Let us start from the existence of geographical equilibria corresponding to NAG
and AG. Given the symmetry of the economy it always holds ∆(1/2) = 0. As a
result 1/2 is locally asymptotically stable, so that NAG occurs upon having an
initial condition close enough to 1/2, whenever ∆′(1/2) is negative. The same
symmetry also implies that the sign of ∆(0) is the opposite of the sign of ∆(1),
so that either both or none of the two borders are geographical equilibria. In
particular AG occurs whenever ∆(0) is negative.
NAG and AG are not the only possible long-run outcomes. Indeed there might
be other interior ﬁxed points leading to PAG. Given our formulation of the tech-
nological externality we are able to identify these other ﬁxed points and study
their global stability analytically. Moreover, given the functional form of ∆(x), it
turns out that the knowledge of the signs of ∆(0) and ∆′(1/2) is enough also to
characterize the existence and the stability of all the other geographical equilib-
ria of our economy, as we shall show in the following proposition. These results
are summarized in Fig. 1. Speciﬁc examples of the functional forms of the rent
diﬀerence ∆(x) are instead given in Figure 2.













a = (1 − φ)
2(αNσ(1 − λ) −  L(1 + λ)
2 + 2αN λ) + 4αNφ(1 − λ)(σ −  ),
b =  λ(1 − φ)
2(2L − αN) − 2αNφ(1 − λ)(σ −  ) .
Consider the trajectories of the dynamical system (3.1) given initial condition x(t =
0) = x0. It holds that
- if ∆(0) = ∆′(1/2) = 0, all x ∈ [0,1] are stable, but not asymptotically stable,
ﬁxed points of (3.1). The geographical equilibrium is equal to the initial
condition x0.
- if ∆(0) ≤ 0 and ∆′(1/2) ≥ 0, but not ∆(0) = ∆′(1/2) = 0, only AG occurs.
The geographical equilibrium is either 0 or 1 depending on initial conditions,
the former when x0 < 1/2 the latter when x0 > 1/2.
- if ∆(0) ≥ 0 and ∆′(1/2) ≤ 0, but not ∆(0) = ∆′(1/2) = 0, only NAG occurs.
The geographical equilibrium is 1/2 irrespectively of the initial condition.
- if ∆(0) < 0 and ∆′(1/2) < 0 both NAG and AG occur. The geographical
equilibrium is 0 when x0 < x−, 1/2 when x0 ∈ (x−,x+), and 1 when x0 > x+.
- if ∆(0) > 0 and ∆′(1/2) > 0 only PAG occur. The geographical equilibrium
is x− when x0 ∈ [0,1/2), and x+ when x0 ∈ (1/2,1].
Proof. Using the expressions in (2.17), after some simpliﬁcations, one ﬁnds
∆(x) =
(1 − 2x)((2a + 4b)(x2 − x) + b)
2(σ −  )(x + φ(1 − x))(xφ + 1 − x)(x + λ(1 − x))(xλ + 1 − x)
, (3.2)
where
a = (1 − φ)
2(αNσ(1 − λ) −  L(1 + λ)
2 + 2αN λ) + 4αNφ(1 − λ)(σ −  ),
b =  λ(1 − φ)
2(2L − αN) − 2αNφ(1 − λ)(σ −  ) .
We can restrict our analysis to the signs and derivatives of N(x), the numerator
of ∆(x). Indeed according to our hypothesis σ >   and φ,λ ∈ (0,1] so that the
denominator of ∆(x) is always positive. This implies that both the signs and zeros
of the rent diﬀerence are equal to the signs and zeros of its numerator, and that
the sign of the derivative of the rent diﬀerence evaluated at its zeros is equal to
the sign of the numerator rent diﬀerence derivative evaluated at the same points.
First notice that N(x) is a cubic function symmetric around x = 1/2. It follows
that the dynamics in (3.1) has at most 5 diﬀerent ﬁxed points: the two extreme
15values 0 and 1 and the three zeros of N(x). Its parametrization in terms of a and




b = N(0) = ∆(0). (3.4)
As a result when a and b are both positive, the derivative of the rent diﬀerence
computed at x = 1/2 is positive, the rent diﬀerence at x = 0 is positive and, by
symmetry, negative at x = 1. Given that N(x) is a cubic polynomial, it must
cross zero in two other points in the interval [0,1], which we name x+ and x− and
are symmetrically located around 1/2. Moreover the marginal rent diﬀerence at
both x+ and x− must be negative, so that these points are indeed geographical
equilibria corresponding to PAG. It turns out that this is the only sign combination
for which the economy is in a PAG status, as can be easily checked by repeating
the same reasoning for all the other sign combinations of a and b. The signs of
N(x), and thus also of dx/dt, shows that the system converges to x− for initial
conditions x0 ∈ (0,1/2) and to x+ for x0 ∈ (1/2,1). All other results follow along
the same lines, see also Fig. 2.
The asymmetric interior equilibria x+ and x− are the solutions of the second












Notice that they are in the interval (0,1) only when a and b have the same signs.
Finally notice that due to (3.3-3.4) all the conditions about the existence and basin
of attraction of geographical equilibria can be given in terms of N(0), and thus
∆(0), and N′(1/2), and thus ∆′(1/2), rather than a and b.
The previous proposition implicitly states that, apart from the non generic case
when both ∆(0) and ∆′(1/2) are zero, there are at most 5 diﬀerent geographical
equilibria, the two border equilibria 0 and 1 and the three interior equilibria 1/2,
x+, and x−. The two interior equilibria x+ and x− exist only when the marginal
rent diﬀerence at 1/2, ∆′(1/2), and the rent diﬀerence of an agglomerated economy,
∆(0) and ∆(1), have the same sign.
The existence and the basins of attraction of geographical equilibria can be
established from the signs of ∆(0) and ∆′(1/2) since they completely characterize
the zeros and the sign of ∆(x). When ∆(0) and ∆′(1/2) have opposite signs, the
long-run outcome is either NAG, when ∆(0) ≥ 0, or AG, when ∆(0) < 0. In the
last case the outcome depends on the initial condition x0. When ∆(0) and ∆′(1/2)
have the same sign also the two ﬁxed points x+ and x− exist. They are stable and









































































Figure 2: Capital rent diﬀerences for all the sign combinations of the coeﬃcients
∆′(1/2) and ∆(0).
the other, when ∆(0) and ∆′(1/2) are both positive. Conversely when ∆(0) and
∆′(1/2) are both negative, they are unstable, and the economy is either AG or
NAG.
Proposition 3.1 also shed lights on the possible transitions between the diﬀerent
type of geographical equilibria as changes in the parameters of the economy occur.
We analyze the 5 diﬀerent possible transitions (both coeﬃcients equal to zero, one
of the two equal to zero while the other is positive, the same when the other is
negative) with the help of Fig. 2. In the special case when both ∆′(1/2) and ∆(0)
are zero, rents are equal for any distribution of capital, that is, there is a contin-
uum of interior equilibria. All these equilibria are stable but not asymptotically
stable. When ∆(0) is positive and ∆′(1/2) changes sign from negative to positive
the economy transits from NAG to PAG. In particular, when ∆′(1/2) = 0 NAG
occurs. Otherwise, when ∆(0) is negative and ∆′(1/2) changes sign, AG always
occurs whereas NAG occurs for ∆′(1/2) negative and vanishes otherwise. Using
the language of bifurcation theory, the two phenomena are known respectively as
a sub-critical and super-critical pitchfork bifurcation. Importantly, in the former
case the transition between non agglomeration and agglomeration is smooth and
does not exhibit the typical hysteresis phenomenon associated with the latter. The
same type of argument is valid when it is ∆(0) that changes its sign. The tran-
sition between full agglomeration and non full agglomeration exhibits hysteresis
when ∆′(1/2) > 0, and is smooth otherwise.
174 The eﬀect of trade and technological openness
In this section we are concerned with the inﬂuence of the inter-regional spillover
λ and of the freeness of trade φ on the possible geographical equilibria of our
economy. We assume consumer preferences, costs structure, number of ﬁrms and
households as given and subject to the two restrictions (2.19) and (2.20). For
this purpose, we translate the geographical equilibria conditions given above in
Proposition 3.1 in terms of the more directly interpretable policy parameters λ
and φ. This is the content of the following
Proposition 4.1. Consider the rent diﬀerence ∆(x) as in (3.2), and assume that





















αN(1 − λ)(σ −  )
 λ(2L − αN) + 1−λ
2 ( L(1 − λ) − Nασ)
,
Θ(λ) =
αN(1 − λ)(σ −  )
 λ(2L − αN)
map the interval (0,1] in the interval (0,1] such that
∆
′(1/2)   0 ⇔ φ   φ
a(λ)
∆(0)   0 ⇔ φ ⋚ φ
b(λ).
(4.3)
Moreover it holds φb(1) = φa(1) = 1, φb(0) = 0 and, when λ   ˜ λ = 1 − S
¯ S,
φb(λ)   φa(λ).
Proof. As with the previous proof we characterize the signs of ∆(x) and ∆′(x) by
looking at the signs of its numerator N(x) and its derivative N′(x). The formula
for N′(1/2) and N(0) found in (3.3-3.4) are polynomial of second order in φ. The























αN(1 − λ)(σ −  )
 λ(2L − αN) + 1−λ
2 ( L(1 − λ) − Nασ)
,
Θ(λ) =
αN(1 − λ)(σ −  )
 λ(2L − αN)
.
Provided that S = N/L < ¯ S one can show that both Γ(λ) and Θ(λ) are positive
for any value of λ. This, in turn, implies that both φa
+ and φb
+ are larger than
1 for every λ in [0,1], whereas φa
− and φb
− are two functions from [0,1] to [0,1]
and corresponds to φa(λ) and φb(λ) given in (4.1-4.2). Taking limits to 1 and 0 it
holds φb(1) = φa(1) = 1 and φb(0) = 0. Furthermore substituting for ˜ λ in Θ(λ)
and Γ(λ) it is immediate to see that φa(˜ λ) = φb(˜ λ) and that φb(˜ λ)   φa(˜ λ) when
λ   ˜ λ. Notice at last that since S < ¯ S it is ˜ λ ∈ (0,1).
The dependence of geographical equilibria on φ and λ is the consequence of
their eﬀect on ∆′(1/2) and ∆(0) which, in turn, depends on the trade-oﬀ be-
tween negative pecuniary and positive technological externalities. Figs. 3-4 bring
together Propositions 3.1 and 4.1 and show for which values of the policy param-
eters λ and φ AG, NAG, or PAG are observed. Despite in Fig. 3 the curves φa(λ)
and φb(λ) are plotted for speciﬁc values of the economy parameters (L, N,  , σ
and α), their behavior and, in particular, the regions they identify are general
properties of the model. Indeed it always holds that φb(0) = 0, φb(1) = φa(1) = 1,
φb(˜ λ)   φa(˜ λ) when λ   ˜ λ, and ˜ λ ∈ (0,1). For the same reason the “bifurcation”
phenomena illustrated in Fig. 4 are also general.
For high values of φ, φ > φb(λ), the technological externality dominates, ag-
glomeration on either sides is a geographical equilibrium and the long run dy-
namics converges either to 0 or 1 depending on initial conditions. Conversely, for
low values of φ, φ < φa(λ), the pecuniary externality dominates and the outcome
is NAG. Irrespectively of the initial geographical distribution, capital, and thus
ﬁrms, distribute equally between the two regions.
For intermediate values of the transportation cost, geographical equilibria co-
exist and two diﬀerent scenarios are possible. For low inter-regional spillovers,
λ < ˜ λ, there are values of the trade cost φ ∈ (φb(λ),φa(λ)) such that the economy
can be either in a NAG or AG conﬁguration (c.f. the left panel of Fig. 4). When
this is the case, the transition from NAG to AG, due to the opening-up of the
economy, is abrupt. Moreover the economy shows hysteresis, that is, once the
transition has occurred it is not the case that going back to a lower freeness of
trade brings the economy back to its non-agglomerated state.
Things are diﬀerent for higher inter-regional spillovers λ > ˜ λ, as shown in
the right panel of Fig. 4. This time AG and NAG are still associated respec-















Figure 3: Existence of diﬀerent type of geographical equilibria in the plane (λ,φ).
The economy parameters are L = 400, N = 150, σ = 3,   = 0.5, α = 0.4. The
dotted and continuous curves are φa(λ) and φb(λ) respectively.
is smoother. Indeed, for intermediate values of φ, between φa(λ) and φb(λ), two
asymmetric geographical equilibria emerge, collapsing on the border (interior sym-
metric) equilibria as φ increases (decreases). These distributions represent PAG
conﬁgurations: due to local spillover, the partial concentration of modern goods
production is advantageous but, due to relatively high transportation costs, a fur-
ther agglomeration is not beneﬁcial as would only increase competition in the
crowded location without enough proﬁts coming from an increased demand in the
other region. Notice at last that the higher the scale of the economy, the closer S is
to ¯ S, which implies lower per-capita capital proﬁts, the closer ˜ λ is to 0, so that the
smooth transition from NAG to AG occurs for a larger set of openness-parameters
values.
5 Welfare Analysis
So far we have assumed that capital moves in order to maximize its rent, rather
than households real income. This begs the question of what happens to household



























Figure 4: Internal ﬁxed points and boundary distributions as a function of φ.
Continuous lines denote geographical equilibria. Left panel: λ < ˜ λ. Right panel:
λ > ˜ λ.
written as total income divided by the price index

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and P2(x) = P1(1 − x).





is negative in x = 0, zero only in x = 1/2 and positive in x = 1. As a result
each household is better oﬀ if ﬁrms agglomerate in his/her own region. In this
case local household does not pay transportation costs for modern goods and, due
to the technology externality, their income beneﬁts from the strongest possible
abatement of ﬁxed costs.
6In this section we use ρ instead of φ as the latter depends also on the preference parameter
σ so that, when computing marginal changes of Welfare with respect to changes of the freeness
of trade, also preferences would be (wrongly) involved.
21Whereas agglomeration is clearly beneﬁcial for the region which happens to host
the modern sector, it is not clear whether it is beneﬁcial also for the whole economy.
This is an important issue in a model like ours, where regions are ex-ante identical
and where workers are not mobile. Finding an answer requires to investigate what
happens to the welfare of the region that specializes in the traditional sector. On
the one hand, households living there have to import all the modern goods so that,
due to transportation costs, they have higher real prices. On the other hand, their
nominal income is the same as that of households located in the modern region,
and they also proﬁts from higher capital rents. The overall result depends on the
relative strength of these two eﬀects, which in turn are related to both trade costs
and inter-regional spillovers, that is, to market and technological openness.
Welfare analysis clearly depends on which type of welfare aggregating function
one considers. Since we are mainly concerned with welfare levels in the traditional
region, the Max-Min formulation seems the most appropriate. We deﬁne total
welfare to be equal to the minimal welfare level between the two regions:
WT(x) = min{W1(x),W2(x)} . (5.3)
Given that beneﬁts of agglomeration spill also to the traditional region, it may well
be the case that agglomeration is the best outcome, also under such an egalitarian
deﬁnition of total welfare as (5.3). The following proposition rules when this is
the case
Proposition 5.1. Consider total welfare as in (5.3). For any given value of the


















AG is the global welfare maximum. Otherwise, when ρ < ρw(λ), NAG is a global
maximum. When ρ = ρw(λ) both NAG and AG are global maxima.
Proof. The proof relies on the properties of income I(x) and of price indexes
P1,2(x). For the income function deﬁned in (2.16-2.18) one can easily show that
I(x) = I(1 − x), I′(1/2) = 0, I′(x)   0 when x   1/2, and I′′(x) > 0. For the
price index functions in (5.2) it holds P1(x) = P2(1−x), P ′
1(x) = −P ′
2(x) < 0, and
P ′′
1 (x) = P ′′






W1(x) x ≤ 1
2
W2(x) x ≥ 1
2 .
22Due to the symmetry of the economy, we can restrict our attention to the maxima
of W2(x) in the interval [1/2,1]. Given the behavior of I(x) and P2(x) it holds both
that W ′
2(1/2) < 0 and that there exists at most one value of x ∈ [1/2,1] where
W ′
2(x) = 0. As a result the global maxima of the continuous and diﬀerentiable
function W2(x) in the interval [1/2,1] are on its border, that is, either x = 1/2
or x = 1. In order to determine when one or the other prevail, we compare their
welfare level and ﬁnd
W2(1)
W2(1/2)

















which proofs the proposition.
AG is a welfare maximum provided that ρ > ρw(λ). In this case the proﬁts
generated in the agglomerated region are so high that they oﬀset the losses due to
a high price index in the traditional region. High ρs and low λs are in fact, respec-
tively, lowering the price index diﬀerence between AG and NAG and increasing the
gains in terms of capital rents due to agglomeration. Notice that since ρw(λ) is an
increasing function of λ, the minimal freeness of trade ρ suﬃcient to make AG the
welfare maximum is increasing with the strength of the inter-regional spillover λ.
Conversely, when ρ < ρw(λ) the welfare maximum is given by NAG. Given these
diﬀerences in welfare levels, when does the geographical economic equilibrium aris-
ing from ﬁrm rents maximizing behavior lead to a total welfare maximum?
Figure 5 tries to answer this question putting together the results from Propo-
sitions 4.1 and 5.1. In the upper left area, above ρw(λ), agglomerated economies
are both a geographical equilibrium and the welfare maximum. In the lower right
area, below ρa(λ), the same is true for non-agglomerated economies. In Fig. 5
starred labels denote those geographical equilibria which are welfare maximizers.
For any value of the inter-regional spillover there also exists an intermediate range
of trade costs where NAG is the welfare optimum but the economic equilibria are
AG or PAG. There seems to be no continuous path that links the upper-right area
AG∗ with the lower-left area NAG∗ . The following lemma shows that this is a
general result. By proving that the curve ρw(λ) lies always above ρa(λ), apart in
the point (λ = 1,ρ = 1) where they coincide, it shows that, unless λ = 1, it is
never possible to move from NAG∗ to AG∗ following a path where the total welfare
is always maximal.
Lemma 5.1. Provided that ˜ S > 0 and S < min{˜ S, ¯ S}, it holds that
ρ
a(λ) < ρ
w(λ), for every λ ∈ (0,1), (5.4)
















* φb φa φw
Figure 5: Geographical equilibria of Fig. 3 which are also total welfare maximiz-
ers are marked with a ∗. They are above the line φw(λ) = (ρw(λ))σ−1 in case
of agglomerated economies and below it for non-agglomerated economies. The
parameters are the same as in Fig. 3.
Proof. By evaluating ρa(λ) and ρw(λ) in λ = 1, one immediately sees that they
are both equal to one. The rest of the statement has been proved numerically. We
have deﬁned a grid of 500 values of σ in (1,100], 100 values of   in (0,σ/(2σ−1)),
which ensures that ˜ S > 0, 100 values of αS in (0,min{˜ S, ¯ S}), and 500 values of λ













when λ ≥ ˜ λ
which together with the fact that all these curves are equal to one when λ = 1,
are monotonic, and ρa(λ)   ρb(λ) when λ   ˜ λ, see Proposition 4.1, proves the
result.
5.1 Welfare enhancing policies
Having derived the total welfare for any value of the “openness” parameter, the
next concern is how an economy can move toward the line ρ = 1, that is, the locus
of the parameters space where the total welfare is the highest. Lemma 5.1 tells us
that the only path that brings the economy to the highest welfare passing through
24welfare maxima is the one that reach the full openness state where λ and ρ are
both one.
In general, under which conditions it is more beneﬁcial to embrace policies that
improve the freeness of trade and when, instead, it is better to go for inter-regional
knowledge spillovers? To answer this question assume the government, by taxing
households income I, can implement policies g which increase the level of freeness
of trade ρ and/or the inter-regional knowledge spillovers λ.
When the policy does not entail a change in the geographical equilibrium its






















where ∂I(x)/∂g stands for the cost of the policy. Under the assumption that a
given amount of money spent by the policy g has the same impact on ρ and λ, that
is, ∂λ/∂g = ∂ρ/∂g, evaluating whether it is more welfare enhancing to increase ρ or




∂ρ , at the diﬀerent geographical equilibria.8
This is the result of the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2. Consider the total welfare WT(x) as in (5.3). Provided that the
economy is in a AG state, it is always more beneﬁcial to increase the freeness of
trade ρ rather than the inter-regional spillover λ. Otherwise, when the economy is














it is more beneﬁcial to increase the freeness of trade ρ when λ > λ+(ρ), to increase
the inter-regional spillover λ when when λ < λ+(ρ), and indiﬀerent when λ =
λ+(ρ).
Proof. The gradient of the total welfare at the two geographical equilibria corre-
7Given the symmetry of the welfare function around x = 1/2, one can easily compute the
eﬀect of the policy also for x ≥ 1/2.
8The evaluation of the policy impact can be complicated by a variation in the geographical
equilibrium distribution of the economy due to its eﬀect on λ and ρ. This occurs at the non-
generic direct transition between NAG and AG and in the generic case of PAG, when the degree
of agglomeration depends continuously on the values of these parameters (see e.g. the left panel
of Fig. 4). Since the parameters space where this dependence occurs is small, as can be seen in
Fig. 3, we skip it at this stage of the analysis.





















σ−1 , x = 0.5, (NAG)



































ρ −1 , x = 0,1, (AG)
Since for AG economies ∂WT/∂λ is zero the best policy is always to increase the
freeness of trade. The result for NAG economies follows from the comparison of the
two components of the gradient evaluated there. The expression to be evaluated
gives rise to a quadratic equation in λ whose only possibly positive root is λ+(ρ)
as in (5.6).
When the modern sector is agglomerated, ﬁxed production costs abatement
does not depend on the inter-regional spillovers, and neither do households welfare.
As a result policies that increase λ have no eﬀects and it is preferable to improve the
freeness of trade ρ. Conversely, when the modern sector is evenly spread between
the two regions, Lemma 5.2 shows that it is more welfare improving to increase
inter-regional knowledge spillovers when λ < λ+(ρ) and to increase freeness of
trade ρ otherwise. Fig. 6 summarizes these results and plots the gradient of the
welfare function on the plane (λ,ρ) for our benchmark choice of the economy
parameters.
6 Exogenous regional diﬀerences
This last section before the conclusion explores the eﬀects of regional exogenous
diﬀerences on geographical equilibria found in Sections 3-4. Two forms of exoge-
nous diﬀerences are considered. The two regions may diﬀer for the number of
households or for R&D costs. In the ﬁrst case we measure the diﬀerence with
the parameter δ and say that location 1 has L(1+δ) households whereas location
2 has L(1 − δ) households. Without loss of generality we impose δ ∈ (0,1), so
that region 1 has always a larger population. Similarly ﬁxed cost diﬀerences are
measured by ǫ ∈ (−1,1) so that ﬁxed costs are proportional to α(1+ǫ) in location
1 and α(1 − ǫ) in location 2. The sign of ǫ is not restricted so that any location
can enjoy the lowest total ﬁxed costs.














Figure 6: Gradients of the welfare function for NAG and AG economies. When
the economy is in a AG state it is always better to increase freeness of trade ρ.
When the economy is in a NAG state it is better to increase the freeness of trade
when ρ is above the line λ+(ρ) and to increase inter-regional spillovers λ otherwise.
The parameters are the same as in Figs. 3,5.
capital rent in each location becomes

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When δ = 0 and ǫ = 0 the symmetric case of (2.17-2.18) is recovered. In order
to keep the model tractable, we focus on the two extreme cases where the inter-
regional spillover λ is either 0 or 1.
27Full inter-regional spillover When λ = 1 the technological spillover operates
globally and all ﬁrms “share” labour ﬁxed costs. Agglomeration forces are weak
and, in the symmetric case, the outcome is NAG for all initial conditions. Indeed
since technological externalities are global and labour is not mobile, households
ﬁrms equidistribute between the two. The outcome in the asymmetric case is sim-
ilar in that a unique geographical equilibrium ˆ x exists and attracts all trajectories
irrespectively of the initial condition. In this case however, ˆ x does not need to be
equal to 1/2, corresponding to NAG, but moves to its right or its left depending
on the regional diﬀerence parameters ǫ and δ and on the freeness of trade φ, as
characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1. If λ = 1 there are two values φ± of the trade openness parameter
such that the geographical equilibrium is PAG if ǫ < 0 and φ < φ− or if ǫ > 0 and
φ < φ+. The PAG equilibrium belongs to the interval (xδ,1) in the former case,
to (0,xδ) in the latter. Otherwise the equilibrium is AG and x = 1 when ǫ > 0
whereas x = 0 when ǫ < 0.
Proof. The rent diﬀerence ∆(x) in (6.2) can be written as the ratio of two polyno-
mials. If λ = 1 the denominator is always positive, so that the study of the second
order polynomial in the numerator N(x) is suﬃcient.
When ǫ < 0 it is N(0) > 0 and N′(x) < 0. The polynomial possesses a single
root in (0,1) provided that N(1) < 0. This root is a globally attracting internal
asymptotically stable ﬁxed point. Conversely, if N(1) ≥ 0 the system agglomerates
in x = 1. Solving N(1) = 0 for φ leads to the identiﬁcation of φ−. The location of
the PAG equilibrium in the interval (xδ,1) follows from noticing that N(xδ) > 0.
When ǫ < 0 it is N(1) < 0 and N′(x) > 0. A similar reasoning leads to the
identiﬁcation of φ+ and to the statement.
When ǫ = 0, that is the two locations are equal in terms of ﬁxed costs, the
technological spillovers, acting globally, do not lead to agglomeration. However,
because of its largest size, region 1 beneﬁts from an home market eﬀect and more
ﬁrms locate there rather than in region 2. Whether the home market eﬀect leads
to an interior or a border equilibrium depends on the freeness of trade. If φ is
large enough the equilibrium is at 1, otherwise it is interior. The same pattern
occurs when ǫ < 0, with the addition that the home market eﬀect is reinforced by
having lower ﬁxed costs in region 1. Comparatively it will be observed that a larger
fraction of ﬁrms settle in region 1. It can also be checked that the threshold φ−
is decreasing with ǫ. The eﬀect of asymmetries might appear more complicated
when ǫ > 0 as ﬁrms located in region 1 face a trade-oﬀ between higher local
demand, due to δ > 0, and higher ﬁxed costs, due to ǫ > 0. However, according
to proposition 6.1, the overall picture turns out to be similar, with the cost saving
eﬀect playing a leading role over the home market eﬀect. In fact, as the freeness
28of trade increases, it is the region where costs are lower that gains ﬁrms till the
point where all ﬁrms are located in the border conﬁguration x = 0.
No inter-regional spillover When λ = 0 the technological spillover operates
only locally. In the symmetric case the strong agglomeration forces induced by
localized spillover induce an AG equilibrium with high freeness of trade and, pos-
sibly, a NAG equilibrium with low freeness of trade. Again regional diﬀerences
shift the position of the interior equilibria but not the overall picture as shown by
the following
Proposition 6.2. Let λ = 0. If
ǫ / ∈
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only AG occurs and the economy is agglomerated in one of the two border equilibria.
Otherwise, there exists a threshold value ˆ φ so that if φ < ˆ φ AG and PAG coexist.
When φ = ˆ φ the ﬁxed point associated to the unique interior equilibrium becomes
unstable through a super-critical pitchfork bifurcation and for φ > ˆ φ only AG
occurs.
Proof. As long as φ > 0, it is ∆(x) < 0 in a right neighborhood of 0 and ∆(x) > 0
in a left neighborhood of 1 so that the border equilibria always exist. Moreover
since the denominator of ∆(x) is always positive and its numerator, N(x), is a
third order polynomial, there exists at most one additional interior geographical
equilibrium.
Consider the extreme case φ = 0. The capital rent diﬀerence reads
∆(x) =
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When ˆ x0 ≥ 1, the only globally stable ﬁxed point is x = 1. Analogously, when
ˆ x0 ≤ 0, the only globally stable ﬁxed point is x = 1. When ˆ x ∈ (0,1), which occurs
when regional asymmetries are not too big, ˆ x0 is the unique interior geographical
equilibrium. Since the numerator N(x) is a smooth function of φ we can conclude
that in the latter case ∆(x) has a zero ˆ x close to ˆ x0 for φ close enough to 0.
Moreover its ﬁst order diﬀerential keeps the same sign as N′(ˆ x0) < 0. Then,
since N(x) is negative for x = 0 and positive for x = 1, there will be two other
roots in the interval (0,1). In this case the two border equilibria and the interior
equilibrium ˆ x coexist. Moreover, as φ increases the root of N(x) in [0,1] reduces
from three two one and there exists a ˆ φ where the super-critical bifurcation occurs,
so that irrespectively of the value of ˆ x0 when φ is close to one the unique root
becomes xǫ and only AG occur.
29The bound on the value of ǫ given in the proposition has been found by imposing
ˆ x0 / ∈ [0,1].
Technological externalities are always strong enough to make agglomerated
economy a stable equilibrium. The basin of attraction of the two agglomerated
equilibria and whether more equilibria exist depend however on regional diﬀer-
ences. For large regional diﬀerences no other equilibria exist. For small regional
diﬀerences, when φ is small enough there exist three geographical equilibria, the
two border and one interior. Conversely, when φ is larger so that the two regions
are suﬃciently trade-integrated, agglomeration is the unique long-run outcome. In
the extreme case when φ = 1, agglomeration either in 0 or in 1 is always the unique
outcome and the basins of attraction of the two border equilibria are easily deter-
mined: ﬁrms agglomerate in region 1 when the initial condition is x0 < (1 + ǫ)/2
and in 2 when x0 > (1 + ǫ)/2. In fact as trade costs are zero and the economy is
fully integrated the region with the larger labour force has no exogenous advan-
tages anymore and basins of attraction are determined by relative ﬁxed costs.
As with symmetric locations, also in presence of asymmetries agglomeration
in either locations is always an equilibrium and when the transition between ag-
glomeration and non agglomeration occurs it does so via an abrupt change. This
transition is however not the rule. Rather it follows from the absence of inter-
regional spillovers.
7 Conclusion
We have set up an analytical model with capital mobility, workers inter-sectoral
mobility and inter-regional immobility, and where agglomeration is due to techno-
logical externalities. These externalities can be interpreted as localized knowledge
spillovers. Due to the analytical resolvability of our model, we have been able to
compute the geographical equilibria, analyze their stability, and fully characterize
their dependence on the trade-oﬀ between technological and pecuniary externali-
ties, as regulated by transportation costs and inter-regional spillovers, and discuss
their implications for total welfare. To retain analytical tractability we have con-
sidered primarily the case of symmetric regions. In the last section we have shown
that our results apply also to the asymmetric case in the extreme cases of fully
local and fully global technological externalities.
In general our analysis conﬁrms previous ﬁndings by Baldwin and Forslid (2000)
about the stabilizing nature of (knowledge) spillovers: the higher the spillover the
larger the interval of transportation costs which lead to ﬁrms equidistribution.
Moreover our analysis shows that if the spillover is high enough, there exists a
smooth equilibrium transition between agglomeration and equidistribution, with
30partly agglomerated economy for intermediate values of transportation costs. In
this case an opening of inter-regional trade does not entail an abrupt reallocation
of economic activities neither the hysteresis eﬀect, typical of NEG model, which
locks the economy in a core-periphery equilibrium also if higher trade costs are
reintroduced.
Welfare analysis reveals that for a relatively large part of the (λ,φ) parameter
space, even if the agglomerated outcome represents the geographic equilibrium, it
generates less welfare in the periphery region than in the core. Since, in any case,
the level of welfare of the periphery in the AG equilibrium increases with trade
openness, for large enough level of φ this solution represent the welfare optimum
for both regions. However, the existence of a large “welfare gap” makes the im-
plementation of policies based on progressive opening of the economy diﬃcult to
implement.
On the other hand, the increase of the technological openness always improves
the welfare level of both locations. When the level of knowledge sharing is low, its
increase represents, from the point of view of the social planner, the best policy.
Beside the positive eﬀect on welfare levels, the increase of λ has also another
advantage: for an economy with strong knowledge/technological integration, the
“welfare gap” between agglomerated and non-agglomerated distribution is smaller
and shallower and, consequently, policy geared toward markets integration are
easier and less costly to implement.
In practice an increase in technological openness can be obtained by improving
global means of information sharing, developing joint education programs, uni-
fying norms and requirements aﬀecting economic activities and the relaxing the
institutional constraints. All these policies have the eﬀect of improving global eﬃ-
ciency by avoiding replicated eﬀorts and by abating knowledge barriers adding to
transaction costs. Concluding, whereas freeness of trade leads, per-se, to sudden
agglomeration, knowledge-based linkages favor a smoother transition between dif-
ferent levels of ﬁrms concentration and ultimately lead to a less uneven distribution
of welfare.
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